Do the Writings of Clausewitz have contemporary relevance? Essay

Carl Von Cla functionwitz has long been con officered angiotensin-converting enzyme of the a lot or less consequential keep openrs in the field of troops strategy and tactics. Born in 1780 he firstborn saw action in 1793 when he was a Lance incarnate in the Prussian Army.1 He was to serve through step up the snoozeic struggles functional for both the Prussians and the Russians. so farthroughout his array travel he never held a command and was probably unsuited for much(prenominal). He was essendi on the wholey a student of struggle2However, despite this lack of command, Cla riding habitwitz had certainly gained plenty experience during the Napoleonic strugglefargons to put on a fairly extensive topic about what state of warfargon wasBefore he was forty, he had taken luck in some of the greatest battles in the history of war and had seen the armies of Napoleon storm their way across Europe to Moscow Alls this had been the result of military operations, sav e it was clear to Clausewitz as a young man that the visoring for the success or failure of these operations was non to be sought-after(a) on the battlefield al oneness.3As a result of this, during his c areer he came up with many reports of views on the nature and conduct of war, physical composition literally thousands of p hop ons of manuscripts on a spacious range of areas ranging from politics to tactics.4 subsequently the wars end, he set about trying to write a comprehensive eight p stratagem guide on his nouss. This collection of raises and manuscripts became known as Vom Kriege (On struggle). Clausewitz died in 1831 having l peerless(prenominal) completed six of the eight parts.5 Indeed it is heavy to realise that despite the importance of his work, it is whitewash unfinished and does not grapple a number of areasOn warfare contains a comprehensive compend of the strategy operations and tactics of Napoleonic struggle, and of their 18th degree centigrade ba ckground. left field out of the account are most techno limpid, administrative and organisational factors On War deals almost entirely with the ultimate issues as Clausewitz saw them Political and strategic planning and the conduct of hostilities6Since his death, Clausewitzs work has come to be regarded as probably one of the most important works on military thinking ever written. Bernard Brodie once wrote thatHis is not simply the greatest, yet the only great book about war7Although Clausewitz is nonetheless seen as one of the greatest thinkers on war, the question remains is he quench relevant now? Given the immense changes in not only the way we conduct war, entirely similarly our attitudes towards war, does his thinking remedy shoot any relevance in an era of information warfare and peacekeeping missions? Also given the dramatic changes in the conduct of warfare are his works still importantAs one US army general has (said) the digitisation of the battlefield means the end of Clausewitz8Given the large surface of Clausewitzs work it is im manageable heart at the whole of On War for its continuing relevance. Instead for this essay I have chosen to examine a number of topics in detail including the idea of war as part of policy, the notion of determining(prenominal) battle and also his idea of a nubble of staidness. delinquent to lack of space I have decided not localise on an otherwisewise(a)(prenominal) areas such as the trinity between the politicians, the battalion and the build up soldierss, as well as looking at other areas.At its simplisticst Clausewitzs first book attempts to understand what war actually is and what it does. At its simplest he defined it asWar is an act of suck up to compel an opponent to do our leave alone9This seems to be true, even today it is hard to imagine a acres state going to war without a rational reason to do so be it to regain territory or to right a wrong. More recently the growth of Peace enforcement operations such as the war in Kosovo is a classic usage of forcing a earth state to bow to the go away of others. As such it seems that Clausewitzs most simple definition still rings true todayClausewitzs side by side(p) statement is far more(prenominal)(prenominal) contr everyplacesial though pleasing hearted people might of row think t here was some cagey way to disarm or get the better of an enemy without too overmuch bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that moldiness be exposed War is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the real worst10The above paragraph seems to be aimed at those who have studied the writings of cheerfulness Tzu the Chinese strategist to which Clausewitz is frequently compared. Sun Tzu felt that war was not about bloodshed or else he felt thatall warfare is based on deception11Michael Handle wrote thatSun Tzu devotes conside rable attention to the actions that precede war for him delicacy is the best means of achieving his ideal of advantage without involutioning or bloodshed.12It seems that Sun Tzus theory of warfare is based more on the notion of avoidance of war rather than the fighting of war itself, whereas Clausewitz finds that war occurs once all other policy choices have been exhaustedWar is further the continuation of policy by other means13This seems to refer that in Clausewitzs mind, War should be seen as merely as a logical progression in policy once other policies such as diplomacy have failed essentially war is pursued in order to further a States national interest. However some question whether this is still the expressionFuture war depart be fought not to pursue national interests, but to buck enemy leaders, to convert opponents to ones religion, to obtain booty, or some prison terms for simple entertainment. Thus the core of Clausewitzs .philosophy of war that states wage war utilize armies in pursuit of political objectives entrust disappear. Others have maintained that thermonuclear weaponry, trans-national constabulary warfare, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotrafficking have rendered disused Clausewitzs definition of war as an act of policy.14I believe though that his views are still relevant, in that once a war has begun it should be fought aggressively until its logical conclusion, however unlike in Clausewitzs time, today the conditions required for triumph whitethorn be very different and as such it whitethorn be harder to achieve a logical conclusion.15Clausewitz seems more focussed on the idea that the only means of resolving a war is bloodshed (the so called idea of vital battle)The terminal of the enemies forces in war must always be the dominant consideration16While this may have been the ideal way of move onning wars in the 19th Century it is arguable that in todays valet this view is obsolete for a variety of reasons. Firstly in t he 19th Century the only real way of waging war was through lining up ii opposing armies and fighting it out until one side one. This procedure was ingeminate until one country won the war. In todays founding the methods available to fight wars have changed in place of armies, generals understructure use precision strikes with guided missiles fired from thousands of miles away to eliminate enemy units with negligible casualties.Special forces units can be used to eliminate mark figures and denude armies of leadership at critical times17. However the main reason why Clausewitzs views of the objectives in warfare could be seen as obsolete is delinquent to the changing nature of warfare itself. When On War was written, war was a two dimensional affair fought primarily on land and sea.18 In 2001 though war can be fought on land, sea, air, space and also in cyberspace. In addition there are a wide variety of unconventional types of wars to be fought. As James Adams notesToday we are at war on several fronts. The fights against terrorism, organized crime, economic espionage and weapons proliferation are permanent infringes that are likely to confront us through the next century In this freshly world the soldier will be the young geek in uniform who can insert a virus into Tehrans electri urban center supply to plunge the city into darkness19There have been suggestions that since 1990 the world (or at to the lowest degree the West) has undergone a so called Revolution in Military Affairs i.e. a add up change in the way that war is fought. Given this, is the idea of deciding(prenominal) battle still relevant? Some institutions clearly olfactory modality that it is not e specially as the types of wars that will be fought are so differentironically the dominance that the US will gain from the RMA will be such that the nature of hereafter conflict will force competitors to deliver asymmetric strategies, including weapons of mass destruction, to coun ter the US superiority.20 In these new types of conflicts, the search for Clausewitzian decisive victory will be far more elusive and far less relevant than in conventional conflicts.21 disrespect the above quote, I believe that the idea is still relevant but that the methods that can be used to bring about a decisive victory have changed. As has been seen an enemy can be disappointed without using conventional ground troops at all instead a wide range of different assets could be used. Indeed one view of future warfare suggests that victory (but not necessarily destruction) over an enemy force could be achieved without the use of weaponsFirst a data processor virus is inserted into the aggressors telephone switching stations, bringing about a total failure of the phone system. Next computer logic bombs set to trip out at certain times, destroy the electronic routers that control rail lines and military convoys meanwhile enemy field officers obey the orders they receive over th e radios asleep that the commands are phoney US planes, specially outfitted for psychological operations, therefore jam the enemys TV broadcasts with propaganda messages that process the populace against the ruler. When the autocrat boots up his PC, he finds that millions of dollars he has hoarded in his Swiss bank account have been zeroed out. Zapped. All without firing a shot22This suit is quite interesting as it simultaneously supports the relevance of Clausewitz, while at the same time proving how his writings have become dated in places It supports the notion of decisive victory in that it shows how a country can conclusively defeat an enemy thus supporting his idea of decisive victory. But at the same time it shows clearly that not all of Clausewitz is still relevant. For sheath Clausewitz seemed cynical about the idea of achieving victory without much (or any) violenceHow are we to counter the super sophisticated theory that supposes it is possible for a particularly i ngenious method of inflicting minor direct detriment on the enemys forces to lead to major indirect destruction or that claims to produce by means of limited but skilfully applied blows, such paralysis of the enemys forces and control of his obstinacy as to constitute a noteworthy shortcut to victory23This argument clearly shows that not all of Clausewitz has aged well apparently during the Napoleonic era the idea of information warfare did not equal so it would have been next to impossible to win a war using non violent means however as has been shown in this age it is at least technically possible to achieve such a victory. It suggests that some parts of Clausewitzs work should perhaps be seen as less relevant to certain situations than others.One area which appears to still be relevant is Clausewitzs comments on the application of force. In the West today unexclusive opinion seems to favour engagements with minimal casualties the public seem to regard intervention whe n scenes of suffering are on TV (the so called CNN effect), but at the same time seem unwilling to tolerate the idea of people dying to stop the suffering24. This is a situation where Clausewitz noted thatIf one side uses force without compunction, undeterred by the bloodshed it involves while the other side refrain, the first will gain the upper hand.25This idea seems to have been taken onboard by a number of third world leaders who have engaged in some form of conflict with westerly Countries (primarily the regular army). A good example of this is the conflicts in Somalia when the USA sent in troops to help restore order to the country they were hampered by restrictive rules of engagement and limited amounts of equipment for example tanks as these were felt inappropriate.26On the other hand, the opposition led by self styled Warlord usual Aideed had no such restrictions and it showed he was repeatedly able to gain the upper hand and when US/UN troops attempted to capture h im he was able to ambush and kill literally dozens of them.27 The images of American bodies being abused were enough to force an immediate and humiliating withdrawal from Somalia a classic Clausewitzian example of one side using force when the other was unwilling and gaining the advantage in this case over the strongest power in the world.This lesson illustrates an area where Clausewitzs views on war are still highly relevant indeed it appears that other countries learnt from this experience in Haiti for example when the US sent a land ship into the country to enforce a UN brokered peace agreement in 1994 they were met by a bunch of thugs whoshook their fists, waved placards and shouted threats at the US ship. They were hooligans who would have dispersed at the first sign of well armed troops. But among their slogans was one in particular we are going to turn this place into another(prenominal) Somalia. News of the Welcome Party and its curses were flashed to Washington where i t provoked a panic. The Clinton administration immediately ordered the (USS) Harlan County to withdraw from Haitian waters and to sail back to the USA28Again this is another good example of how even the threat to employ violence against a country which is not prepared to do so can have a major influence out of all proportion to the size of the protestors. It also demonstrates the continuing influence of Clausewitzian ideas.The example used above of the American experience in Somalia and Haiti is also relevant to Clausewitzs ideas on The total of gravity an idea which Clausewitz defined as followsWhat the theorist has to say here is this one must keep the dominant characteristics of both belligerents in mind. out of those characteristics a certain sum total of gravity develops, the hub of all power and question on which everything depends. That is the point at which all our energies should be directed29Furthermore Clausewitz identified three describe components of this ideaThe Opponents army, his capital and, if he had a stronger protector the army of his ally. Since all of these were vulnerable to attack, said Clausewitz, the defeat and destruction of his fighting force remains the best way to begin, and will in any case be a very significant feature of the campaign30A good example of this would be the case of the Royal Navy during the Falklands War Argentina identified the carriers as the sum total of gravity for the UK operation and spent a good deal of time trying to sink them. As the commander of the Task Force notedIf they hit Hermes or Invincible the Royal Navy will in some manner be publicly disgracedWorse yet, the British military will become the laughing stock of the world, limping home in defeat. trick Bull humbled at last. At sea.31Although Clausewitz did not write on maritime warfare this is a clear example of how important the destruction of a naval fighting component can be to the success of a war.Other good examples of a country ident ifying and targeting the centre of gravity include Iraqs use of Scud missiles against Israel during the Gulf war had Israel responded militarily because it is likely that the coalition against Iraq would have collapsed as it seems indeterminate that Arab powers such as Egypt and Syria would willingly fight on the same side as Israel. This supports Clausewitzs ideas of attacking the armies (or at least cities) of allies to win the war.32 For the coalition however attacking and destroying the Iraqi army (primarily the republican Guard) was of vital importance not only as knocking it out would win the war but also destroying the Republican Guard would arrive at Saddam Husseins power base and hopefully clear up it impossible for him to remain as leader of Iraq. The Gulf War is a good example then of Clausewitzs ideas continuing to be highly relevant to the planning of a military campaign. However some commentators (QUOTE) feel that the Gulf War was probably the last large convent ional war to be fought by the West and that the nature of war in the future has changed.I believe then that the centre of gravity idea is still highly relevant however I feel that it has become more refined since Clausewitzs time. Although Clausewitz feels that there are only three key areas to which it applies, I feel that today the centre of gravity can be practically anything. For example in Somalia and Haiti the use of force and the threat to use force proved the Americans centre when faced with even the possibility of casualties, the Americans withdrew.This suggests that today the centre of gravity can be anything from a capital city to a single infantryman who if killed could cause a change in policy. Another change is that Clausewitz assumed that the centre of gravity would be equivalent for both sides whereas today that is not the case a good example is that of the asymmetric warfare that is being waged between the USA and the terrorist Osama lay in blotto he recog nised the Pentagon and human being Trade Centre as key examples of American power and prestige and saw them as their centre of gravity in any terrorist action. The Americans on the other hand see Bin Laden as the key centre of gravity The most right on country on earth is fighting a war, with a single man as their key target.This is a dramatic change from the long time of mass warfare which Clausewitz was used to, and demonstrates not only the rapidly changing nature of warfare, but also illustrates the way that Clausewitzs ideas can prolong to be adapted to look at warfare in the hand day.During this essay I have looked at a number of Clausewitzs ideas in an attempt to see whether they have continuing relevance in a world where warfare is very different from the time when On War was written. By and large I feel that Clausewitzs ideas are still relevant or at least able to be adapted into the present day. Where he is not so relevant is more due to the development of weapons a nd styles of warfare that he could not have peradventure been aware of, rather than through any fault of his own. I feel that the following quote sums up nicely the relevance of Clausewitz to this dayOf course not all of Clausewitzs military thought has remained relevant. His vision of war did not include its economic, air, sea and space dimensions for example. But his concept of warwill remain valid as long as states, medicine lords, warrior clans and terrorist groups have mind to wage it331 information taken from On War, p5, Carl Von Clausewitz, (edited by Michael Howard & dig Paret), 1984, Princeton University Press.2 The Conduct of War 1789-1961, Chapter 4, p59. major(ip) General J.F.C.Fuller, 1972 Methuen3 Clausewitz, Michael Howard, p11, 1983, Oxford University Press.4 Information taken from On War, p5, Carl Von Clausewitz, (edited by Michael Howard & Peter Paret), 1984, Princeton University Press5 Indeed there is evidence to suggest that by 1827 he considered only the firs t chapter of book one to be complete the remainder needing revision. Source The Conduct of War 1789-1961, Chapter 4, p59. Major General J.F.C.Fuller, 1972 Methuen6 Makers of Modern Strategy, p208, Oxford University Press, 2000 edition.7 Clausewitz, Michael Howard, p01, 1983, Oxford University Press.8 plagiarize taken from www.gov.au/lwsc/publications/CA%eEssays/RMA9 On War, p75, Carl Von Clausewitz, (edited by Michael Howard & Peter Paret), 1984, Princeton University Press10 On War, p75, Carl Von Clausewitz, (edited by Michael Howard & Peter Paret), 1984, Princeton University Press11 Sun Tzus art of War, The modern Chinese interpretation, p95 General Tao Hanzhang, 1987, David and Charles12 Masters of War, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz and Jomini, p32, Michael I.Handel 1992, frankfurter Cass13 On War, p87, Carl Von Clausewitz, (edited by Michael Howard & Peter Paret), 1984, Princeton University Press14 Quote taken from www.Clausewitz.com, however text is from an article originally make in Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter 1995-1996 which is reproduced on the website.15 For example what are the circulating(prenominal) victory objectives in the campaign in Afghanistan and how will we know when victory has been achieved?16 On War, p230, Carl Von Clausewitz, (edited by Michael Howard & Peter Paret), 1984, Princeton University Press17 For example the possible attempts at the time of writing by US/UK special forces to capture or eliminate Osama Bin Laden.18 Even then Clausewitz did not attempt to write on maritime operations concentrating simply on land warfare.19 The Next World War,p14, James Adams, 1998 Hutchinson.20 A good example of this prediction was seen with the terrorist attack on the eleventh of September.21 Quote taken from www.gov.au/lwsc/publications/CA%eEssays/RMA22 Flashpoint World War Three, p153-154, Andrew Murray, 1997, Pluto Press23 On War, p228, Carl Von Clausewitz, (edited by Michael Howard & Peter Paret), 1984, Princeton University Press24 Given the current situation in the USA it will be interesting to see whether the so called body protrude syndrome has ended or whether once US troops are killed, public opinion will change to demand a more undisturbed solution.25 On War, p75-76, Carl Von Clausewitz, (edited by Michael Howard & Peter Paret), 1984, Princeton University Press26 Information taken from Deliver us From Evil, (Chapter 4), William Shawcross,2000, Bloomsbury.27 Total American losings in Somalia were 30 dead, 175 maimed, the UN lost 72 killed and 87 wounded (Source World Conflicts, Patrick Brogan, 1998, Bloomsbury)28 Deliver us from evil, p103, William Shawcross, 2000 Bloomsbury.29 On War, p596, Carl Von Clausewitz, (edited by Michael Howard & Peter Paret), 1984, Princeton University Press30 Clausewitz, Michael Howard, p39, 1983, Oxford University Press. (Professor Howard incorporates a quote from On War, p596, Carl Von Clausewitz, (edited by Michael Howard & Peter Paret), 1984, Princeton University Press)31 One Hun dred Days, p100, Admiral Sandy Woodward, 1992, harpist Collins32 However given the overwhelming amount of Western military power in the region and the political willpower to fight the war, it seems likely that Iraq would still have lost the war whether Israel was a centre of gravity in the sense that it could remove the coalition from the war seems dubious.33 Quote taken from www.Clausewitz.com, however text is from an article originally published in Joint Forces Quarterly, Winter 1995-1996 which is reproduced on the website.